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Abstract
A serious weakness is identified in the ID-based structured multisignature
scheme of Lin, Wu and Hwang.
1 Introduction
A cryptanalytic attack on the ID-based structured multisignature scheme of
Lin, Wu and Hwang, [1], is described below. This attack enables one user
from a group of users to forge multisignatures on arbitrary messages. This
enables the forgery of both partial multisignatures and ‘complete’ multiig-
natures for the entire ‘group’ of users. The attack requires only two known
multisignatures created by the group concerned.
The notion of Lin, Wu and Hwang, [1], is used throughout. Note in particular
that, in line with [1], the word group is used to mean the defined collection
of individuals authorised to create a multisignature. It has no relationship
to the standard mathematical notion of a group.
2 The attack
First suppose a user wishes to be able to forge user u’s contribution to a
multisignature. For simplicity suppose u = u1 for some serially ordered
group of signers (u1, u2, . . . , un). Note this initial attack applies to the serial
signing version of the scheme.
The attacker first arranges for two messages, m, m′ say, to be multisigned.
These messages can be chosen arbitrarily except that they must satisfy
gcd(h(m), h(m′)) = 1.
The probability that this will be true for arbitrary messages m and m′ is
good, and if it does not hold then a multisignature on a third message will
very probably be sufficient. Then, there will exist integers a and b such that
ah(m) + bh(m′) = 1.
(Finding such a and b is simple using the Euclidean algorithm).
When user u1 computes the multisignatures on messages m and m
′, the
following values are computed and made public:
S1 = α
k1h(m) mod N
1
and
S ′1 = α
k1h(m′) mod N.
Suppose the attacker has these values and has computed a and b as above.
The attacker can now compute
(S1)
a(S ′1)
b mod N = αak1h(m)+bk1h(m
′) mod N
= αk1 mod N
The value αk1 mod N can now be used to forge a partial multisignature for
user u1 on any message of the attacker’s choice.
Using precisely the same reasoning, two ‘complete’ multisignatures for the
same user group (in the serial signing case) can be used to forge arbitrary
numbers of multisignatures on messages of the attacker’s choice. Similar at-
tacks apply to the parallel and ‘mixed’ versions of the multisignature scheme.
3 Concluding remark
Since this note was first written, one of the authors of [1] (Chih-Yin Lin) has
devised a modified version of the scheme which resists the attack described
above. For details of this revised version please contact Professor Lin at
lincy@iim.nctu.edu.tw.
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